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Recent Developments 
Giant Food, Inc. v. Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation 
Disqualification of Unemployment Eligibility under Section 8-1004 of the Labor 
and Employment Article Is Lawful when There Is Substantial Curtailment at the 
Individual Facility or Premises 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that 
disqualification of unemployment 
benefits under section 8-1004 ofthe 
Labor and Employment Article of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland 
("section 8-1004"), applies when 
there is a substantial curtailment of 
work caused at the employee's 
individual location of employment. 
Giant Food, Inc. v. Department of 
Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, 
356 Md. 180,738 A.2d 856 (1999). 
In so holding, the court ended an 
ongoingjudicial debate over whether 
"substantial curtailment" means an 
individual place of employment or an 
entire business entity. 
Giant Food, Inc. ("Giant"), is a 
retail grocer that owns and operates 
several distribution centers, 
warehouses, stores, and plants in 
Maryland and other Mid-Atlantic 
states. Teamsters Local 639 
("Teamsters"), represented by the 
Department of Labor, Licensing, and 
Regulation ("DLLR"), is a union of 
truck drivers who delivered to all of 
Giant's Mid-Atlantic locations. The 
Teamsters went on strike after a 
collective bargaining agreement 
between Giant and the Teamsters 
expired. The strike caused Giant's 
warehouse, distribution centers, and 
manufacturing plants to cease 
operation, resulting in an estimated 
four million dollars of lost profit. 
By Traci Gladstone Corcoran 
Subsequently, over one thousand 
employees who participated or 
assisted in the strike, applied for 
unemployment benefits. 
The Board of Appeals of the 
DLLR, the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County, and the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland all 
found that the employees were entitled 
to unemployment benefits. The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland granted 
Giant's writ of certiorari to decide if 
the Teamsters were disqualified, due 
to a substantial curtailment of Giant's 
operations, from receiving 
unemployment benefits. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by acknowledging its role to 
review and determine if the 
administrative agency's decision was 
based on proper legal standards. 
Giant, 356 Md. at 184-85,738 A.2d 
at 858. The legal issue before the 
court was whether, under section 8-
1004, which replaced Article 95(A) 
section 6(e), the Teamsters were 
"disqualified" from receiving the 
unemployment benefits. Id at 186, 
738 A.2d at 859. 
The court of appeals cited 
section 8-1004, specifically the 
language: 
(a) grounds for disqualification 
. . . (1) an individual who 
otherwise is eligible to receive 
benefits is disqualified from 
receiving benefits for each 
week for which the Secretary 
finds that unemployment 
results from a stoppage of 
work, other than a lockout, 
that exists because of a labor 
dispute at the premises where 
the individual was last 
employed. 
Id. (citing Md. Code Ann., Lab. & 
Empl. §8-1004(1991». Thecourt 
first applied the fundamentals of 
statutory construction, opining that the 
plain meaning of the rule is "not 
absolute," and that a court must 
review a statute in light of the 
"purpose, aim, or policy of the 
enacting body." Id at 189, 738 A.2d 
at 861. The court further stated that 
any unrealistic interpretation should 
be avoided. Id 
The court next analyzed whether. 
"premises" is defined as one particular 
unit of a business operation, or the 
entire business entity. Id at 190, 738 
A.2d at 861-62. The court noted 
that when section 8-1004 was 
enacted, "factory, establishment, or 
other premises," was replaced with 
merely "premises." Id at 191,738 
A.2d at 862. Based upon its 
comprehensive review of the statute's 
history, the court of appeals held that 
the difference in word choice had no 
effect on the statute's substantive 
meaning. Id. In further support of 
its holding, the court relied on a 
legislative report which expressly 
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stated that the purpose of the changed 
semantics in the revised section was 
to modernize and clarify, and not to 
create a new policy. Id. According 
to the court, the report also indicated 
that there was a valid attempt made 
"to ensure that a proposed revision 
conforms as nearly as possible to the 
intent of the General Assembly .... " 
Id. The court then turned to 
subsection (a)(2) of section 8-1004 
which states, "if separate branches of 
work that usually are conducted as 
separate businesses in separate 
premises are conducted in separate 
departments on the same premises, 
each department shall be considered 
a separate premises .... " Id at 193-
94, 738 A.2d at 863. 
The court also discussed the fact 
that the Maryland statute originated 
from an English statute. Id at 192, 
738 A.2d at 862-63. In Saunders v. 
Maryland Unemployment 
Compensation Board, 188 Md. 677, 
53 A.2d 579 (1947), the court noted 
that the English statute is virtually 
identical to the Maryland statute, and 
that "the English disqualification 
statute, since its inception, has 
maintained a definition of place of 
employment or work limited to each 
individual site of employment, not the 
employer's entire operations." Id 
(citing Saunders, 188 Md. at 687-
88, 53 A.2d at 583-84). 
The court went on to analyze the 
meaning of the "stoppage of work" 
language of section 8-1004. Id at 
196, 738 A.2d at 864. The court 
referred to Employment Security 
Admin. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 
292 Md. 515,438 A.2d 1356 
(1982), where it held that a majority 
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of jurisdictions held the "stoppage of 
work" to a "substantial curtailment" 
standard. Id at 197, 738 A.2d at 
865 (citing Browning-Ferris, 292 
Md. at 528-30, 438 A.2d at 1364-
65). Aware that substantial 
curtailment varies and that it is 
dependent upon "the type of 
business" at issue, the court applied 
this standard to the facts of the instant 
case. Id at 198-99, 738 A.2d at 866. 
In so doing, the court held that 
Giant's activities had completely 
ceased, and that the Teamsters' strike 
had constituted a "stoppage of work" 
under section 8-1004. Id 
In support of its decision, the 
court of appeals utilized persuasive 
authority from other states with 
"similarly-worded" statutes. Id at 
199-200, 738 A.2d at 866-67. The 
most poignant aspect of this analysis 
came from the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska. Id at 200-01,738 A.2d 
at 867. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland cited Magner v. Kinney, 
141 Neb.l22, 130,2 N.W.2d 689, 
693 (1942), which held "that a 
'stoppage or curtailment of work' 
may occur in one of three forms: (1) 
total cessation of work in the premises; 
(2) cessation of work by part of the 
employees, which prevents others in 
the premises from working; or (3) 
diminished patronage by customers, 
which produces unemployment." Id 
(quoting Magner, 141 Neb. at 130, 
2 N.W.2d at 693). The court of 
appeals also cited a case from Illinois, 
which held that a "stoppage of work" 
occurs or affects the individual plant, 
or place of employment, but "not the 
employer's business as a whole." Id 
at 201, 738 A.2d at 867 (quoting 
Central Foundry Div. v. Holland, 
36 Ill.App.3d 998, 1002, 345 
N.E.2d.143, 147 (1976)). 
The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland concluded that the 
distribution centers, the warehouse 
centers, and the manufacturing plants 
ceased operation as a result of the 
strikes, consistent with the intent of 
section 8-1004. Id. at 203-04, 738 
A.2d at 869. Accordingly, the 
employees were disqualified from 
receiving unemployment benefits 
because "there was a substantial 
curtailment of operations at each of 
these premises to cause a stoppage 
of work." Id at 205, 738 A.2d at 
870. 
In Giant Food, Inc., the court 
of appeals sets the standard for review 
in cases arising out oflabor disputes, 
which result in work stoppage, where 
the employees are subsequently 
disqualified from receiving 
unemployment benefits. This decision 
will have a profound effect on workers 
in Maryland because the courts have, 
in previous cases, been unwilling to 
disqualify them from receiving 
unemployment if the employer's 
company still operated as a whole 
despite the strike. Yet courts will now 
be less apt to allow benefits to 
workers even where only the 
individual's place of employment 
ceased operations. Likewise, the 
holding in this case gives Maryland 
labor attorneys a bright line standard 
with which to assess their active and 
potential cases relating to labor 
disputes. 
